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Discussion After the Speeches of H. David Rosenbloom and
Robert Brown
QUESTION: Professor King- I wanted to pursue the question of
arbitration and settlement of dispute where there is an overlap in taxa-
tion between Canada and the United States. In the treaty there is a
provision for competent authority, which means that the tax people,
from both countries settle their dispute where there is an impact from
both countries on the same income in Canada and the United States.
There has been reference to arbitration here. What are your views
on whether the competent authority is working satisfactorily from a
time standpoint? If you have arbitration who would be the arbitrators?
Is a change in that regard a good deal?
ANSWER: Mr. Brown: The first question is whether the Compe-
tent Authority or Mutual Agreement provisions of Canada- U.S. Tax
Treaty are working.
I think they are working reasonably well. The complaint is that
they take a devil of a long time and they are rather complex. That
simply means that if there is a dispute between the two authorities as
to how to divide up the income pie, Canada and the U.S. tax authori-
ties will get together and try to reconcile it. They can only achieve that
if they are working on more or less a common basis of how to proceed.
If, for example, the U.S. were to adopt, one method of income
allocation, and Canada were to follow another quite different method,
you should not assume that the competent authority procedure would
be able to reconcile that kind of thing.
So there is a moderate amount of confidence in the present work-
ings of it. But some fear that if we just keep on with competent author-
ity, we we will not get there, because the competent authority clause
just means the two governments try and get an agreement. It does not
guarantee that they will.
The alternative and binding arbitration would involve appointing
someone independent to arbitrate the matter, and to give a final deci-
sion that is legally binding. The decision would override domestic law.
That might be nice; however, I do not think it is practical. I do not see
any government, particularly the U.S. Government, giving up those
kind of tax rights to an independent party.
I think that what you do need is to strengthen the competent au-
thority procedure and to build it with more processes so it becomes
increasingly effective. There is a commitment to really attempting to
make it work. But there should also be a committment to a common
methodology. I think this would begin to help. But I would interested
in David's thoughts.
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ANSWER: Mr. Rosenbloom: I am essentially more pessimistic.
The competent authority in the past, as distinguished from the near-
term future, should really be looked at country-by-country. And the
United States' competent authority experience with Canada is the ab-
solute best in the world. The United States' competent authority expe-
rience with certain other countries is dismal. Competent authority pro-
cedures can take up to five, seven, eight years to resolve in the United
States. So I think the past has not been uniformly great, but it has
worked pretty well with respect to Canada.
In the United States the competent authority operates under a se-
vere handicap, in that the people who administer our treaties are not
the people who negotiate them. That is also true in Canada. And there
is something of a disconnect between agreements at the negotiating ta-
ble and the way in which they are actually implemented. That is a
problem with calling for better use of the competent authority. We
simply do not have the people do it. We are not prepared to commit
those resources.
Where I get pessemistic is the future. If you have to extract one
concept from my feelings about this program, it is that, in looking at
the direction in which we are going, the trend line is down.
There has been cooperation in the past with Canada. It has been
pretty satisfactory. But the United States has launched a highly theo-
retical system of substantive rules and Canada has said very clearly
that they will not be able to award relief. So the countries are very
much at loggerheads, and no amount of resources in the competent au-
thority is going to be able to resolve transfer pricing disputes, which
incidentally represents about 90 percent of all competent authority
matters. So I think at least the short- to medium-term ability of the
United States international tax treaty network to resolve these disputes
is not good.
Now I think arbitration might help. Arbitration is a two-edged
sword because, in the past, the lack of arbitration has caused the com-
petent authorities, particularly in discussing with Canada, to work hard
to achieve agreements. But there are some countries, particularly Ja-
pan, where really seems to be no way of resolving some very substantial
cases involving transfer pricing. I am not sure how many years of hun-
dred million dollar transfer pricing adjustments are required before ar-
bitration looks appealing. However, I am not at all convinced that the
United States would, ever freely use arbitration.
QUESTION: Ms. Coward: I would be interested in your comment
on the relationship between the use of the tax policy, and in particular
tax incentives, and how this relates to the use of subsidies and other
economic development instruments.
I know that at the international level there have been efforts to
keep government and finance departments out of the "hurly burly" of
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the international trade negotiations. At the same time as we see in-
creasing discipline on subsidies as economic tools, the use of tax policy
and tax incentives seems to be coming more obvious and certainly there
are questions being raised about it, whether there is actual conflict or
not. I wondered if you had any comments or had thought about those
issues?
ANSWER: Mr. Brown: Well, the simple answer is, it is a jungle
out there. You will find other different countries, different states doing
virtually everything. Around the world the use of direct subsidies to
corporations is slowly declining. In part that is due to trade issues be-
cause these things are countervailable, and they can get you into
trouble.
Nobody agrees what the definition of a subsidy is and you can still
find some pretty outstanding issues, when for example, even in the
United States a local government is trying to buy a big plant. The
world is your oyster. They will build the roads. They will build sewers.
They will build the plant with tax free bonds. They will do everything.
And then they say this is not a subsidy.
I think that there is an issue, which has come up in some tax cases
as to whether tax incentives are a subsidy. The general theory is that
direct subsidies were bad, were countervailable, were discriminatory
and should be phased out. But as for tax incentives, every country has
tax incentives. When you really get down and pull it apart tax incen-
tives are really just a different form of subsidies. They are delivered
through a different delivery mechanism.
General tax incentives, like, concession on corporate rates, or an
investment tax credit for all capital spending does not seem to get peo-
ple worked up. But if Canada, for instance, delivered a particular tax
incentive to the forestry industry through the tax system, it would
pretty rapidly get into the Software Lumber case, and give rise to
issues.
I think that around the world you will find that highly specialized
subsidies, even those delivered through tax incentives, are likely in the
decline but we will have lots of generally tax subsidies, basically as a
means of influencing the level of overall economic behavior, rather than
influencing a particular industry.
ANSWER: Mr. Rosenbloom: From a U.S. tax policy perspective,
tax incentives have one basic flaw, which is that they do not work effi-
ciently. The general attitude that the United States exhibited with re-
spect to DISC and FISC programs which are explicit tax incentives
can be summarized in lay terms as follows: "It other countries give
subsidies for experts, then we shall retaliate by giving several billion
dollars to our industries for conduct that they would engage in any
way." One does not have to be a genius to see that such programs are
incredibly expensive.
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There is, however, another class of tax incentive which is hidden.
In international taxation there are many rules that are not well under-
stood, and that operate as a greater subsidy, a greater incentive, than
the explicit incentives.
For example, we have a rule, which says that if you pass title to
goods outside the United States, your income has a foreign source.
Most people who are not conversant with the rules lose interest at this
point, because to go on and explain the concept of a foreign source of
income, requires a journey through our foreign tax credit rules, which,
as Bob has already explained, are very complicated.
But the fact of the matter is that the title passage rule is an in-
credibly potent tax incentive. There have been a couple of assaults on it
in recent years but it is still the law.
Speaking from the standpoint of a tax policy person, I think the
best incentive one could give to cross-border business is a low rate of
corporate tax. And you only can achieve that by keeping other incen-
tives down. That has been the direction in the United States. We are
not quite there yet, but we have been moving in that general direction.
Much of the rest of the world still prefers a model in which rates
are high and you have a swiss cheese corporate tax, with incentives for
various industries and specified behavior. In an ideal world, the United
States would move in the direction of eliminating tax incentives, so
there would not be an issue of comparing them with subsidies.
QUESTION: Mr. Doh: Does the increasingly stringent application
of the arm's-length approach to transfer pricing result in a lower price
for this transaction? Is it possible that we are setting up companies and
running them differently than what we have been talking about, which
involves margins for both profit and overhead?
ANSWER: Mr. Rosenbloom: I am glad you asked that. You are
from the Commerce Department? Yes. The U.S. Government, bless
their hearts, sees no contradiction whatever toward a foreign company
when it says that the company sold the same product at a price that
was both too high and too low. I have cases like that - there are
scores of them. It applies not only to dumping, but also to customs. The
connection between dumping or customs and tax is limited, I think, to
drawing the attention of the Internal Revenue Service to a particular
industry. It happened in automobiles. It happened in consumer elec-
tronics. It happened in a number of other imports. But there is zero
consistency, indeed there is total inconsistency, in the application of the
rules.
QUESTION: Mr. Doh: Is there any higher remedy for
reconciling?
ANSWER: Mr. Rosenbloom: No. Not only is there no higher
remedy as a substantive matter, but it is not easy to see how as a pro-
cedural matter you could do it. The real problem is customs. Although
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dumping is also a problem, the law there applies at a different level of
the market. Dumping, as I understand it, applies to sales to ultimate
consumers, so you could conceive of a situation where the sale from the
foreign producer to the U.S. importer was too high, but the sale to the
consumer was too low. You can twist yourself into a pretzel and find
consistency there.
But Customs involves the sale from abroad to the United States.
That is the very transaction that is tested under the transfer pricing
rules. And there are plenty of cases where customs says that the price
was too low and the IRS says that the price was too high. There is no
remedy; moreover, Customs is in and out in a very short period of time.
The Revenue service has not yet stirred and Customs is gone. By the
time the Revenue Service arrives, often six, seven, even eight years
have passed. So there is no remedy. There is no refund. There is no
way to reconcile. And it is the same transaction. Interestingly enough,
Congress does not seem concerned.
QUESTION: Professor King- I have a question on the 482, which
involves the reallocation of income between what is applicable to the
United States and what is applicable to the foreign subsidiary. These
allocations favor the United States. They cause contention abroad be-
cause frequently the government has had the benefit of that income
abroad and has taxed it accordingly. In some cases I assume they spent
the money. Now, as a solution, what about addressing the time of au-
dit, so you do not have so much time elapse between the U.S. audit and
the need for reallocation, or the date when the income was incurred?
Or should you do it by tax treaty modification?
ANSWER: Mr. Rosenbloom: Actually, the U.S.-Canada Treaty
has a provision that is aimed at that subject, and it puts a lot of pres-
sure on the Revenue Service. It says: "If there is a transfer pricing
adjustment and the taxpayer fails to give notice to Canada within six
years from the end of year to which the adjustment relates, we will not
make the adjustment." The Revenue Service hates that provision. Six
years is not enough time for them, and they have really tried to keep
similar provisions out of subsequent treaties.
This is similar to the point that we were discussing in regard to
dumping and Customs. I do not know if it is possible, but you would
think it ought to be possible to accelerate audit activity. Much of the
problem has to do with personnel. We can talk all we want about ab-
stract principles and making the system more efficient, but when the
auditors doing these basically thankless jobs are being paid a pittance
compared to what they could be paid in private industry, particularly in
our large cities where most of the audit work is, I do not see how we
are going to ask a lot more efficiency from them.
The trend line is in the other direction. We have a three-year stat-
ute of limitation for tax cases in the United States, and there is a state-
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ment in the Internal Revenue Manual that the statue of limitations will
only be extended in rare and unusual circumstances.
I venture to say that, for any company above a relatively small
level, it is a rare and unusual circumstance in which the statute is not
extended, several times. Usually it is extended for up to eight or ten
years. I think audits are getting longer; I am only up to 1984-1985 in
what I am doing today. That is ten years behind the time. So I do not
have a lot of optimism on this subject.
But you are quite right in saying that the governments have col-
lected taxes and spent them.
In the recent case with Nissan, where the United States sought an
adjustment of about three hundred million dollars, and got I think over
hundred million dollars in tax, refunds were given in Japan and the
local communities were very upset. They were forced to pay a portion
of that refund, because the Japanese in that case did agree to a refund
in the competent authority procedure, and it created a real political
problem in the local jurisdictions.
QUESTION:. Mr. O'Grady: Keeping in mind the deficit, how
much would you say a potential tax revenue is tied up in this sort of
revenue inventory, this ten-year inventory that remains to be dealt
with?
ANSWER: Mr. Rosenbloom: That is an interesting question. I
would say probably quite a bit. But to squeeze it out is a very time-
consuming task. We had a case, a famous case, involving Suudstrand
Corporation, which represents a capsulized version of the problem. The
case involved two years of taxes of the company from the early 1980's.
I believe that it took the Tax Court 11 years to work that through the
system, and to come to a conclusion. At the end, the Tax Court's deci-
sion was hundreds of pages long. It was very fact intensive, but it said
virtually nothing about subsequent years. And Suudstrand is now back
in court for the subsequent years.
There is substantial potential revenue out there. But our system
has invited this very lengthy, very costly litigation process, which I am
not sure can be accelerated. If your suggestion is to bring the revenue
in more quickly, I am just not sure how to do it.
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